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American Cultural Mythologies

Commentary Anthony Ashbolt

FaIling Everywhere
Postmodern Politics and American Cultural
Mythologies

History repeats itself, endlessly and sometimes tiresomely.
Numerous writers and scholars have woqied abo~t the divisions social, political and cultural '-which began permeating American
society in the 1960s. The unravelling of America, the coming apart
of America, became familiar refrains. During the 'sixties itself,
Daniel Boorstin's new left barbarians were at the gate threatening the
very, genius of American politics which Boorstin had postulated in the
previous decade. l This genius, itself a cousin of American
eXl::eptionalism, revolved around the erosion of ideological division,
, and the l~ck of vigorous difference within the American polity.
Rather than 'this producing a bland one dimensionality, it guaranteed
the preservation of liberty, of individual freedom. Individuality and
commonality, far from being somewhat contradictory forces, fed off
each other, securing ahappy consensus. This was pure mythology, of
1. D. Boorstin, 'The New Barbarians: The Decline of Radicalism', in, his The Decline of
Radicalism: RefleCtions ofAmerica Today, New York, Random House, 1969, pp. Pl-34; The
Genius ofAmerican Politics, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953.
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course, which isnot to suggest there were no elements of truth in it,
but rather' that Boorstin's analysis was· ideologically self-serving and
more than a little immodest. The genius of 'the genius of American>
politics' was that it masked profound divisions, dislocations and
disorders by inventing an ideal political community un mediated by
class, race, gender or ideology; a dream world whi"h functioned as
the intellectual version of a mass culture myth propagated in many
forms (one for instance, being the televised ideal family, untroubled
by external disorder or real internal division). And it is mass
culture, more than commentaries like Boorstin's, which has cemented
certain neces~ary national myths but these myths have resonance within
intellectual life and serve to obscure the flipside of capitalist success.
For American liberals, capitalism has nourished the individual and
valued individual freedom. Yet for the eloquent German sociologist
Werner Sombart, the lessQn of American. exceptiona;lism was
different. Writing in the first decade of this century he observed that
in America 'one's financial property and income [forms] the basis of
how one is evaluated. Feeling for the unmeasurable uniqueness of
personality and for the essence of the indiv:idual disappears'. 2 The
cash nexus, commodity fetishism and consequent reification (not
Sombart's words but his .implications) underpinned social life in
America. Yet Sombart also acknowledged the relatively privileged
position of the '(white) worker in the American public domain - the
trappings of class had all but disappeared, so too had class
consciousness, as high standards of living and educational opportunity
narrowed (or so it seemed) social distances. A degree of social
homogeneity unthinkable in Europe prevailed in the States and this
provided the foundations foJ," civic cohesion. National consensus,
civic cohesion and s0cial homogeneity all informed Daniel Bell's
much later 'end of ideology' thesis, penned just before the revival of
bitter ideological conflict in America. 3 More recently, however,
Bell joined a growing chorus wondering about the direction .of
America. In particular" he referred to 'the sense' of exhaustion
[marking] i~tellectual life' and 'the unravelling of the middle class'.
'The economic foundation for culture', he concluded, 'is beginning to
show cracks and that presents a crisis of confidence in the very future
of society'.4 The withering away of old certainties, the challenge of
those new to positions of power, the cultural dissolut~on and politic41
2. W. Somba~c, Wkr is There No Socialism in thi? United States?, New York,> M.E.Sharpe Inc.,
1976 [1906], p. II.
3. D. Bell, The End of1deology, New York, The Free Press, 1960.
4. D. Bell, 'The C].Ilture Wars', Quadrant, July-August, 1992, p. 26; see also 1. Kriscol,
'America's Mysterious Malaise', Times Literary Supplement, 22 May 1992, p. 5.
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disillusionment, ail combined to signal a warning - the centre do.es
not hold, perhaps' there no longer is a centre, political correctness
rules the campuses, multiculturalism has transformed educational
priorities in dangerous ways and an overwhelming sense of things
falling apart prevails. All this depends upon a necessary national
myth, the myth that there used to be a common culture, common
ideals, a cohesive citizenship, a coherent polity and it is. all now
coming apart at the seams. To be sure, something is happening Mr
Jones. A .shift to the postmodern does rupture elements of tradition.
ltis, however, easy to exaggerate the supposedly splid core of
American public life.
Arthur Schlesinger Jnr. celebrates the national identity fostered by
the United Stanis, 'a brand-new national identity, carried fqrward by
individuals who, in forsaking old loyalties and ,joining to make new
life, melted away ethnic differences'.5 Americanization was a
triumph of American exceptionalism,. removing group allegiances"
tribal loyalties and making the many into the one. Now, however,
identity is up for grabs and American identity is just one among
many. Schlesinger worries that 'the cult of ethnicity' has as its
'underlying philosophy' the idea 'that America· is not a nation of
individuals at all but a nation of groups'.6 In reality, it was the cult .
of liberilJ historiography which, being blind to collective identities,
reproduced the myth ·of individualism and individu~ity. To think
that black sharecroppers in Alabama were 'a bunch of individu?ls',
just like the 'bunch of individuals' who were longshoremen in San
Francisco, or the 'bunch of individuals' who sat in executive rooms on
Fifth Avenue. This is the intellectual variation on a theme developed
by ~ass culture. American television depended upo~ and helped
reproduce the myth that, to use the words of Todd Gitlin, 'we're all
folks', underneath everything we're all the same 7 - this folksiness
protects itself from. the world of difference (even if it acknowledges
difference - token blacks, token workers) by standardizing and.
homogenizing, .by creating a one dimensional world where 'the
essence of the individual disappears' but the myth of the individual
remains. So too, Schlesinger's individuals should have one dominant
collective identity - the American identity - and that is why what
is pu,t in the educational curriculum is .so important: 'The debate
about the curriculum is· a debate about what it means to be an

American

A

.
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me.ncan. I et, as Michael Walzer has argued, that meaning was
;md IS far from ~bs~lut~.9 Indeed, Walzer suggests that rather than a
coherent
Amencamsm,
there has always been a 'decentered' n at'lon,
c·
L.
,
an lI~con~re~ce. He further argues that 'a radical program of
AmencamzatlOn would really be un-American' .10 There is a t f·
.
. Wal '
no eo
lrony.m
zer ~ use of the term 'un-American' but it still reflects a
peculiarly Amencan way of viewing things (as Boorstin amongst
~the:s, has recognized).ll Moreover, he seems to underes;imate the
slgmficance of A~ericanization. Like so many scholars he is .
relu~tant todemomze mass cll;lture and .thus leaves it floating as a
belllgn popular culture which enshnnes a certain sort of
~mericanness.12 Never~heless, informed by Walzer's perspective, the
hbe~al and conservauvearguments concerning the educational
c~mc.ulum and how much it should embody racial and ethnic
dIverSIty, take on .a diff:renr meaning ~ they deny historical reality
and rely upon the mventlOn of a mythical oneness. .
For Schlesinger, as for Bell and many others the national mood has
c~a~ged. '~aning American optimism' reflects a national psyche in
criSIS, propeUmg people to look back rather than forward. Instead of
cheering ?n this revival of historical memory,· the liberal historian
bemoans Its tendency to detract from the American futures market 13
?he ris~ng cult of,ethnic~ty is a symptom of deereasing confidenc'e'
m AmerIca ... and today 1t threatens to become a counter-revolution
against the. original. the~ry of America as "one people", a common
cultu.re, a sm~le natlOrt. 14 The myth of commonality runs alongside
the lIberal faith in progress. It was in the 1960s that this liberalteleology was questioned vigorously and it is, of course, to the 1960s
tha~ ~cholars like Schlesinger trace the roots of today's tribalism and
po.hucal' correctness. American identity, so the story now goes, is
?emg ~ractu.red by ethnic groups claiming the world as their own and
mven:mg ~I~tory in their own image. Identity politics certainly did
have Its OrIgIns m the 1960s, but its central role in radi<;:alism is a
post-1960s phenomenon. Indeed, there is a sense in which the rise of
identity politics signalled the withering away of the new left's search
. : .
for community.

8, Schlesinger, p. 17.

9. M. Walzer, 'What Does it Mean to Be an "American"?' Social Research vol 57

S. A. Schlesinger Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society,

New

York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1992, p. 13.
6. Schlesinger, p. 16.
7. T. Gitlin, interviewed on Th.e Truth About Lies: The Tube' is Reality, a Panopticon
Production for Channel Four (England), 1991.

1990, p. 591-614.
10. Walzer, p. 614.
11. Boorstin, p. 14.
12. Walzer, p. 606-7.
13. Schlesinger, p. 41.
14. Schlesinger, pp. 41, 43.
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Like Schlesinger, Robert Hughes trots out a few tired old
falsehoods about the 'sixties and he also relies upon th~ same sort ofnational myth {there once was a solid coherent whole, but it's now
falling apart or,. to use his term 'fraying').15 With the rect!nt end of
the Cold War, Hughes argues, a plethora of issues constructs the
political and a 'sense ofcommon citizenship dissolved'.!6 We could
be forgiven for thinking this is all for the good if common
citizenship is the same as mindless patriotism, but Hughes is
referring to a process of depoliticization. He fails to recognize that
the process began much earlier than the 1970s and 1980s and is very
much bound up with the nature of contemporary liberal capitalism.!?
These' days depoliticization is fuelled by the constant claims that·
Marxism is dead .. So it comes as no surprise when Hughes asserts
'Marxism is dead; that part of history is over'.!8 Waxing lyrical
about depoliticization, he gives it another nudge along. ' ..
Hughes deplores the attempt to create artificial nationality out of
cultural, racial or sexual difference ('Queer nation, indeed')19 but he
fails to find something peculiarly American in all of. this. The
postmodern national myths emerging from identity politics share
much in common with the myth of America. The oc;:casionally
overblown claims generated by a politics of identity can, in part, be
seen as a product of a mass mediated age in which the need for myth
is ever more apparent. As the America of Boorstin and Sch~esinger,
itself a myth, appears. to disintegrate, why not ~eplace one national
. myth with another when politics in America today involves the
. reproduction of simulacrum? This to be sure, is an exaggeration, but
the demands for separatism and claims of nationhood are desperate
pleas which rely upon mythologies which hardly negate the dominant
culture. Indeed, mythologies of identity and difference· actually
mirror the mythologies of unity and sameness. And identity politics
can and does, as Robert Hughes argues, fuel a culture of victims.
Joel Schumacher's film Falling Down provides a cogent
commentary on both victim-culture and the argument that there was
once a: coherent whole, a real America which is now falling apart .
(hence the title,' to my mind deliberately ironic). A man, clearly
suffering from stress and mental anguish, leaves his car during a
traffic jam o~ a Los Angeles freeway and walks away determinedly.
15. R. Hughes, Culture of Complaint: The Fraying of America, New York, Oxford University
Press, 1993.
16. Hughes, p. 36.

17. See A. Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism,
New York, The Free Press, 1977, p. 288-321.
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'Where do you think you're going', yells one angry driver. 'I'm
going home' replies the man. Home here functions as a metaphor for
America, the idealized America of Hollywood, of billboard
advertisements, a u.nited America. undisturbed by class, race,
et~nicity and gender. The man, played by Michael Douglas, is
trymg to get home to that America, but also trying to get to his real
home. But there no longer is.a 'real' home because his wife, with
child in tow, left him due to his supposed violent propensities. We
learn that the Douglas character (known mainly as D-Fens, after his
car's numberplate), has lost his job in the defence industry, a job in
the belly of the beast. He is another victim, only this time he
personifies the white, male, middle class 'victim' of the 1980s. .
, Surrounded by independent women and fanatical minorities,
besieged by both social. processes of urban decay and mounting
violence, and by economic processes of restructuring and
. internationalization, the world of the white, middle class male is
coming apart. He is the real victim today, a victim, in part, of all
those who claim victim status. Or at least, that is how many
audiences and critics viewed the filmmaker's intentions
Schumacher, however, does not endorse or legitimIze the Dougla~
character. Rather, he develops a critique of current American society
and a critique of the mythologies which have sustained America in
the past but are finally unravelling. Unlike Schlesinger and Hughes,
Schumacher knows that it is American mythologies as well as'
American society which are 'falling down'. Apparently. audiences In
America cheered when D-Fens assaulted a Korean 'store owner,
trashed his store and then confronted and literally blew away Latino
gang members. Schumacher's film, however, is a black comedy and
a disturbing one. It allows you at one level to identify with D-Fens.
Yet the actions of D-Fens are not defended or glamorized. At times'
standard Hollywood action scenes are satirized ruthlessly but it is
possible to miss the satire. In a superb sequence, D:-Fens arises as a
sovereign consumer and exercises his 'rights' in a Whammy Burger
shop. The culture of sanitized mass food production, policed by
. youthful soulless automatons, has never been captured more
effectively. We may feel a sneaking admirationfor the way in which
D-Fens challenges the ethos of Whammy Burgers but part of the pain
of the film is that you can identify and laugh with a guy who is
plainly crackers (because the rest of the world isn't far off it anyway).
This is not just another Hollywood story, a 'Coming Home' type of
sentimentalism in search of the real America. It resonates with the
dilemmas of the time and provides a blistering commentary upon

18. Hughes, p. 73.
19. Hughes, p. 75.
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Am,erican mythologies in general and Hollywood mythologies in
particular.
Paradoxically, a further element of the thesis that America is
falling apart is provided by those who believe that HollyWood itself
is betraying real American values. Michael Medved" for instance,
, sees good old-time ,small-town American values and virtues being
eroded by a film industry which puts sexual promiscuity, violence,
cynicism, about religion and patriotism, and anti-Americanism in
general on a pedesta1. 2o The argument that H()llywood films or
television shows have been, in the main," anti-American over the last
decade or so (the influence of a generation reared on 'sixties
radicalism, of course) is hard to sustain. The violence and everything
else that disturbs Medved is as American as cherlY pie. He is thus
depending upon, or trying to resuscitate, the notion that the real
America .is being eroded by values somehow external to it. This
type of thinking is cold war ideology in a different guise and its
America is the land of the Walsh family from 90210 or, going' back
(can you go, further back than the Walsh family?) of Ozzie and
Harriet. It is the America of Sears Roebuck catalogues and
wondrous department stores. It is the America oLfrontiers without
inhabitants and limitless possibilities for those drawn from other
lands. It is the America untrammeled by ideological politics, which
is content to pursue pragmatism and in which thrift" inditstry and
loyalty always payoff. Such myths lie at the core of American mass
culture and much contemporarycultural'criticism. The sentiment
that real American PQlitical, cultural and social values are w;ithering
away under pressure from diverse groups claiming their own
identities, and at the expense of an American identity, is just another
version of that cultural mythology.
'I'm going home,', says D-Fens. Yet there no longer is a home.
More tellingly, there never was.

20, M. Medved, Hollywood vs. America, New York, Harper Perennial, 1992.
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